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I. INTRODUCTION
When we attend Hamlet, we expect to see a young prince and
hear his immortal words, "[t]o be, or not to be."' Although we may
assume that the director or actors will allow themselves some creative
latitude, the end result, Hamlet's deep despair and unfortunate death,
is fixed. We certainly do not expect an actor to change the meaning of
the play by saying the words while laughing hysterically or while
standing on his head. Doing so would leave the language intact, but to
change the meaning of those words is to change Shakespeare's intent.
Likewise, when we read a federal statute, we expect certain words
to be contained within that statute and we expect those words to have
certain meanings. As we read the statute, the clear and unambiguous
words should be our guide to the statute's particular purpose. By
reading the statute, in many instances, we know the end result. The
interpretation and ultimate end of the statute should not change
because a judge does not like the tragic ending.
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1 (Philip Edwards ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1985).
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Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is labeled
"Employment. "2 In Title I, we find rights, remedies, and procedures
for those discriminated against in employment because of a disability.
Title II of the ADA is labeled "Public Services."3  Here, we find
rights, remedies, and procedures, for those prevented from utilizing a
public service because of a disability. The courts, however, have read
the language of Title II differently.
Like an actor portraying a comedic Hamlet, many courts have
read Title II to protect public employees from employment discrimi-
nation.4 Yet there is no mention of employment in Title II. Recog-
nizing this misinterpretation, in Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice,5
the Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of Title II clearly
indicates that public employees may not bring an employment dis-
crimination claim under Title II. Instead, public employees must sue
under Title I, adhering to the same strict administrative requirements
as private sector employees.6
Rather than allowing an actor to turn Hamlet into a comedy, the
director might have him perform Much Ado About Nothing instead.
Similarly, Congress gives the disabled protection from discrimination
at public facilities in Title II. In Title I, Congress provides them with
separate protection from employment discrimination. In the interest
of judicial economy and avoiding frivolous law suits, the decision in
Zimmerman was the correct interpretation of Title II.
In 1995, the Oregon Department of Justice hired Scot Zimmer-
man as a child support agent.7 Because he suffered from a disabling
eye condition, Mr. Zimmerman requested certain accommodations to
do his job.8 The Department refused to comply and fired Mr. Zim-
merman within one year.9 After his dismissal, Mr. Zimmerman failed
to file a timely complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) prior to bringing suit, as required under Title I
of the ADA.'0 Therefore, his Title I claim was dismissed." Mr. Zim-
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Co.
Soil and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Texas A&M
Univ., 145 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 1998); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37
(2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
5. 170 F.3d 1169, 1183 (9thCir. 1999).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1171.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).
11. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 983 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Or. 1997).
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merman also brought a claim under Title II as a public employee.2
By also filing under Title II, Mr. Zimmerman was not required to first
exhaust his administrative remedies. 13
At trial, Mr. Zimmerman's Title II claim was dismissed pursu-
ant to a federal rule 12(b)(6) motion. 4 The trial court held that Title
II did not apply to employment because that would be inconsistent
with the structure of the ADA as a whole." Title I would become
redundant as to public employees because they could bypass those
administrative requirements and sue under Title 11.16 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. 7 Mr. Zimmerman
petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc, but his request was
denied." Mr. Zimmerman then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court
for certiorari, but his petition was denied."
This Note will analyze Title II and explain why, in the interests
of judicial economy, the Zimmerman court correctly held that Title II
does not apply to employment discrimination. First, this Note will
discuss the particular wording of the ADA, specifically comparing the
language of Title I to the language of Title II. Next, this Note will
briefly consider the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, because Title II
should be interpreted consistently with that Act.20 Then, using the
analysis announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.2", this Note will examine the Title II
regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice. Finally, this
Note will analyze the five key arguments used by the Ninth Circuit in
Zimmerman.
This analysis is critical to the interpretation of the ADA for sev-
eral reasons. First, Zimmerman was decided in the face of considerable
precedent to the contrary. As of today, at least five other circuits have
12. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999).
13. Id.
14. Zimmerman, 983 F. Supp. at 1329-30.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1184.
18. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 183 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1999). In the Ninth
Circuit, a request for a rehearing en banc is required before a party may petition the Supreme
Court.
19. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 121 S. Ct. 1186 (2001). In a recent United
States Supreme Court opinion, Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct.
955, 960 n.1 (2001), the Court recognized the disagreement among the circuits, but dismissed the
question of whether employees may sue their state employers under Title II, holding that
certiorari was improvidently granted.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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held that Title II does apply to employment discrimination, 22 creating
a split of authority among the circuits. Second, if public employees
are allowed to bypass Title I and sue under Title II, Title I becomes
redundant as to public employees, and congressional intent is ignored.
By suing under Title II, public employees, unlike all other employees,
are not required to obtain a right to sue letter from the EEOC. 23
Without requiring employees to exhaust administrative requirements
that might provide a remedy in lieu of litigation, public employee
claims bypass a legitimate screening mechanism intended to conserve
judicial resources and give employers an opportunity to remedy viola-
tions prior to being brought into court. Public employees would be
more protected than other employees, which might be an unfair
advantage that Congress did not intend.
Additionally, many public employees already have state statutory
provisions in place that protect them from employment discrimina-
tion. For example, Oregon's Revised Statutes, title 22, "Public Offi-
cers and Employees," chapter 241, "Civil Service for County Employ-
ees," contains a provision requiring that an employee be dismissed
only for cause.24 Similarly, certain specified Oregon State employees
have the right to appeal their dismissals to the Employee Relations
Board.25 Washington also protects employees from dismissal and
allows them to appeal to the Personnel Appeals Board under its "State
Civil Service Law. ,26
Finally, a comparison of the ADA with other discrimination
statutes demonstrates that Zimmerman applied the correct analysis.
Under Title V1127 and Title IX 28 , all employees are required to exhaust
administrative requirements before the EEOC prior to filing a dis-
crimination suit. Title I of the ADA adopts the same administrative
22. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Co. Soil
and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Texas A&M Univ.,
145 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 1998); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.
1997); Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
23. Title II follows the administrative regulations of the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabil-
itation Act does not have an exhaustion requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994). Title I
adopts the guidelines set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
(1994). Under Title VII, a charge must be filed against an employer within 180 days of the
unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).
24. "No person in the classified civil service who has been permanently appointed under
ORS 241.020 to 241.990 shall be dismissed except for cause, and only upon the written accusa-
tion of the appointing power or the commission." OR. REV. STAT. § 241.430 (1999).
25. OR. REV. STAT. § 240.560 (1999).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.06.170 (1999). Additionally, under WASH. REV. CODE §
49.60, Washington has a discrimination law that also protects disabled individuals. The Wash-
ington statute may actually be more protective than some federal laws.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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requirements as Title VII.29 Thus, the ADA should be interpreted
similarly.
As a particularly persuasive example of Congress' intent that
public employees be held to the same standards as all other employees,
consider the Government Employee Rights Act (GERA), passed one
year after the ADA, which applies the same antidiscrimination laws to
federal government employees excluded from the ADA.3" The statute
specifically states that federal employees must file a complaint with
the EEOC and receive a right to sue letter.3 These employees may
not bypass the administrative requirements.32 Allowing similarly situ-
ated state government employees to bypass administrative require-
ments and sue under Title II of the ADA would be irreconcilable.
Because federal and state employees are so similar, it is inconsistent for
Congress to allow state government employees one set of rights, while
granting federal government employees not covered by the ADA
another.
II. THE WORDING OF TITLE I COMPARED TO THE WORDING OF
TITLE II: "WHAT Do You READ MY LORD?"
"WORDS, WORDS, WORDS" 33
Title I of the ADA is titled "Employment,"34 while Title II is
titled "Public Services."3 While a title does not tell all about a par-
ticular statute, it is a good starting point. Title I is a comprehensive
employment statute that details everything from how one with a
disability might be discriminated against in the workplace,36 to who is
considered an employer,37 to what an employee must do in order to file
suit.3" Congress intended employment discrimination to fall under
"Employment," or it likely would not have taken up several pages in
the United States Code with such specific employment provisions.
In contrast, Title II does not contain the word "employment,""employer," or "employee." Instead, Title II defines "public entity '39
and discusses architectural, communication, and transportation bar-
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
30. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1220 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
31. 2 U.S.C. § 1220.
32. Id.
33. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12117.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
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riers to services.4" One might suspect that because Congress so tho-
roughly detailed employment discrimination in Title I, where all
employees-public employees included-may file a complaint, no
need existed to address the issue in Title II.
However, even though the words "employment discrimination"
are not found in Title II, the courts have adopted various ways of
reading the statute so that it might encompass employment. Ignoring
the clear language of Title II, courts have devised other ways of
finding that the statute provides for public employee discrimination
claims. The following sections discuss the various interpretations of
Title II's definition of employment discrimination.
A. Some Courts Have Broken the Language of Title II into
Two Separate Clauses
In response to not finding the words "employment" anywhere
within the province of Title II, some courts have broken the language
of Title II's discrimination section 41 into two separate clauses in order
to read "employment" into the statute. The first clause states: "no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the ser-
vices, programs, or activities of a public entity. . . . ",4 The second
clause states: "or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 44
By reading these clauses separately and distinctly from one another,
some courts have held that the second clause is a "catch-all phrase"
encompassing employment discrimination.4" This reading fails for
several reasons.
Breaking the language of Title II into two separate clauses
ignores statutory construction and misconstrues the meaning of Title
II. First, statutory construction demands that the statute be read
broadly, not in small abbreviated parts. 6 Second, even if read sepa-
rately, the second clause applies to the public entity's "services, pro-
grams, or activities," not to any and all forms of discrimination.47
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
42. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Co. Soil and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816,
822 (11th Cir. 1998); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir.
1997).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822.
46. See generally Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.").
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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Third, when compared to the discrimination language of Title I, Title
II contains none of the same detail or form.48 Fourth, if Congress
intended the clauses to be read separately, it would have drafted two
separate clauses. Finally, the two clauses intend to prohibit two
different types of discrimination: the first prohibits disparate treat-
ment, and the second prohibits intentional discrimination.
For example, in Crowder v. Kitagawa,49 the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that most people would agree that a public agency with stairs
but no elevator is not intentionally discriminatory. Instead, one might
say that the stairs are a barrier to that public agency or that the stairs
prevent one class of people from gaining access to a "service, program,
or activity." (i.e. disparate treatment)." Preventing a disabled indi-
vidual from participating in a class or from going on a walk just
because she is disabled (when she would otherwise be able to gain
access to the program) is intentionally discriminatory."' In other
words, disparate treatment unintentionally prevents a disabled indi-
vidual from participating in a public program because of an unfore-
seen barrier (i.e. not having books available in Braille), whereas
intentional discrimination deliberately prevents a disabled individual
from participating (i.e. declaring she cannot take the class because she
is blind). These two different types of discrimination are covered by
each clause in Title 11-employment is not.
B. Some Courts Apply the Second Clause to
"All Operations of Government"
Some courts have also attempted to characterize Title II's word-
ing as two distinct clauses with the second clause applying to "all
operations of local government," thus allowing the court to include
zoning regulations within Title II's language. Although courts have
used the second clause to invalidate zoning regulations in Bay Area
Addiction Research and Treatment v. City of Antioch (hereinafter Bay
Area) 2 and Innovative Health Systems v. White Plains,53 it is arguable
that these regulations could have just as easily been invalidated
48. Title I states, "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). Obvi-
ously, the language of Title I applies unconditionally to employment discrimination, while Title
II contains none of the same language.
49. 81 F.3d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1996).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999).
53. 117 F.3d 37, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1997).
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because zoning is a "service, program, or activity" of local govern-
ment.
Both Bay Area and Innovative Health Systems involved alcohol
and drug clinics that were denied zoning permits to build on or near
residential property. Refusing to allow an exemption for zoning activ-
ities, each court declined to draw an arbitrary distinction that would
permit public entities to discriminate in some activities and not in
others.5 4 In both cases, the courts held that Title II was applicable to
local government zoning ordinances, and that zoning was "a normal
function of a government entity."ss
The ADA does not specifically define "service, program, or
activity." To interpret this language, courts look at section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, on which Title II is modeled. 6 The Rehabilita-
tion Act defines "program or activity" as "all of the operations" of
specific entities, including "a department, agency, special purpose dis-
trict or other instrumentality of a state or of a local government.""
Zoning regulations are a normal function of a government entity that
may impermissably discriminate against the disabled." Zoning reg-
ulations are one specific "output," or public service, that Title II looks
to monitor. Therefore, zoning regulations are distinguishable from
employment as a governmental "output."
C. The Zimmerman Court Adopts an "Outputs"
Versus "Inputs" Analysis
The Zimmerman court adopted an "outputs" versus "inputs"
analysis, which seems to most accurately describe the wording of Title
II.s The court reasoned that the first clause of Title II actually refers
only to the "outputs" of a public agency.6" An example of such an
output is French classes at a local community college.6' In contrast,
the professor hired to teach the class would be an "input" and would
not fall within the protection of Title II.62 The second clause in Title
II only differs in its method of prohibiting discrimination in public
services, it is not a catch-all phrase.61 In its analysis, the Zimmerman
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id. at 44-45; Bay Area, 179 F.3d at 731.
56. See, e.g., Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978
(9th Cir. 1997).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A) (1994).
58. See Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 44.
59. 170 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999).
60. Id.
61. See generally Decker v. Univ. of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575, 578 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
62. See generally id.
63. See Zimmernan, 170 F.3dat 1175.
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court looked at what services, programs, or activities the public entity
expects to provide and what services, programs, or activities the public
expects to receive.64 In both instances, the public and the agency
expect either a nature walk from the parks department or an art class
from the local community college, but not the park ranger's or
teacher's employment.6  The public does not expect to receive
employment and the agency certainly does not expect to provide
employment under Title 11.66 In filing an employment discrimination
claim, the individual is not attempting to obtain a public service, but
rather to claim discrimination in an employment action. Therefore,
following the Rehabilitation Act and correctly interpreting congres-
sional intent, the Zimmerman court concluded that Title II's language
does not protect a person from employment discrimination.
III. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973: "WHAT
A PIECE OF WORK IS A MAN!" 67
Congress specifically modeled Title II of the ADA on section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.68 Section 504 prevents discrimination
by those public entities receiving federal funding.69 With the enact-
ment of Title II, Congress broadened the scope of section 504 to
include all public entities, regardless of whether or not they receive
federal funding.7" Congress even included similar language in Title II:
"[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of
Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights the subchapter
provides... "71 Thus, the language of section 504 is inescapably tied
to the language of Title II.
Congress also required that the regulations contained in section
504 be construed consistently with any regulations established under
Title 11.72 Yet, although these regulations must be compatible with
one another, it is only to the extent that they overlap. Congress did
not mean to incorporate section 504 regulations into Title 1."73 An
explanation of Congress' intent that the two sets of regulations be
construed consistently is discussed below in Section Five.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
68. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978-79
(9th Cir. 1997).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
70. 42 U.S.C. §12132.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b).
73. Id.
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Based on the interconnectedness of these two statutes, one might
be tempted to simply construe Title II in the same manner as section
504. For example, because section 504 was found to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination prior to the enactment of the ADA, 4 courts have
connected the two and found that Title II must, likewise, apply to
employment.75 Even though these statutes are visibly intertwined, a
closer look at the language of both statutes does not require Title II
and section 504 to be coextensive. First, although the wording of the
two statutes is similar, the context is fundamentally different. Addi-
tionally, section 504 contains sections specifically concerning employ-
ment, while Title II contains no employment language. Further,
although section 504 does apply to employment discrimination, it is
linked to Title I, not to Title II.
Although section 504 and Title II use similar wording, they are
meant to apply to fundamentally different types of discrimination.
Rather than adopting the broad language of section 504 in Title II,
Congress chose to narrow the language to specifically cover a public
entity's "services, programs, or activities. '76  Because section 504 is
primarily concerned with federal funding, its goal is to prevent
discrimination in the entire operation:
For the purposes of this section, the term "program or activity"
means all of the operations of-
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distrib-
utes such assistance and each such department or agency
(and each other State or local government entity) to which
the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State
or local government[.]77
In contrast, under Title II, Congress is only concerned that indi-
viduals with a disability not "be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity.... "7 The language is much broader in section 504, where
74. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 631-34 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir.
1995) ("Because the language of the two statutes is substantially the same, we apply the same
analysis to both."); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Co. Soil and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816,
821 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that because Title II was intended to work in the same manner as
section 504, it is unquestionable that Title II applies to employment discrimination).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1994).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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Congress intended to prevent federal dollars from going to discrimina-
tory employers. Therefore, the adoption of such an all-encompassing
statute meant Congress could prevent employment and other types of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The Title II
language is narrower because the same employees Congress was con-
cerned about in section 504 are covered in Title I. Congress' decision
to narrow the focus in Title II demonstrates its intent that Title II not
be coextensive with section 504.79
Additionally, the history of section 504 demonstrates that
employment discrimination was always part of the Rehabilitation Act,
while Title II contains no language evidencing that employment was
ever meant to be included. At the time section 504 was adopted, the
goal was to "promote and expand employment opportunities in the
public and private sectors for handicapped individuals." 80 Section 504
contains several employment provisions. For example, the term
"handicapped individual" is defined solely in relation to employment:
"[t]he term 'handicapped individual' means any individual who (i) has
a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or
results in a substantial handicap to employment; and (ii) can reason-
ably be expected to benefit in terms of employability."' Because
section 504 contains no separate employment section, and because of
the express employment language included in the statute, it is appar-
ent that Congress meant section 504 to apply to employment. In
contrast, Title II contains no provisions concerning employment.
Instead, the ADA has a separate section governing employment where
all employment related provisions are found-Title I.
Further, section 504 links its employment provisions to Title I.
The Act states, "[t]he standards used to determine whether this
section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrim-
ination under this section shall be the standards applied under [T]itle
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 .. ."2 It seems
irreconcilable that Congress would link the Rehabilitation Act to Title
I (the "employment" section), while the court would link Title II to
employment through the Rehabilitation Act. Congress' amendment
to the Rehabilitation Act in 1992 linking the employment sections to
Title I of the ADA is clear evidence that Congress did not intend
Title II to apply to employment. Congress demonstrated with these
1992 amendments that it knows how to make its intent clear by
79. See Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1181 (9th Cir. 1999).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1973).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(A) (1994).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994).
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linking the employment provisions of the two statutes together. Con-
gress could have also created a link between Title I and Title II, but
failed to do so. Therefore, Title II is not meant to apply to employ-
ment discrimination.
IV. THE CHEVRON8 3 ANALYSIS: "MADNESS IN GREAT
ONES MUST NOT UNWATCHED Go"84
A Chevron analysis is used by courts to review an agency's con-
struction of a statute that the agency administers.8" In Zimmerman, the
court was concerned with the Attorney General's regulation constru-
ing Title II,86 which states "[flor purposes of this part, the require-
ments of Title I of the Act, as established by the regulations of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1630,
apply to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted
by a public entity if that public entity is also subject to the jurisdiction
of Title I.',87
Under Chevron, the first question the court must ask is whether
Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue.88 If congres-
sional intent is clear on the statute's face, then the court and agency"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress."89 If, however, Congress has not directly addressed the issue,
the court will not impose its own construction of the statute; rather,
the agency's interpretation must be based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.9" When the court looks at an administrative
agency's regulation, the court must give controlling weight to the
regulation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute." 91
The Zimmerman court determined that Congress answered the
precise question at issue: is employment discrimination included
within Title II of the ADA?92 According to Zimmerman, Congress
unambiguously expressed its intent-Title II does not apply to
employment.93 Because congressional intent is clear, the court gave
83. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
84. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
86. The Attorney General's office is the agency appointed to promulgate regulations con-
cerning Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a).
87. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (b)(1) (2001).
88. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
89. Id. at 843.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 844.
92. See Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999).
93. Id.
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the Attorney General's regulation no weight.94 Other courts have also
found that because employment is not mentioned in Title II,
Congress' clear intent is that Title II does not apply to employment.95
Only one of the five circuits that disagree with Zimmerman did a
Chevron analysis, Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Co. Soil & Water Conserva-
tion Dist.96 In Bledsoe, however, rather than performing the first step
and analyzing whether or not Congress unambiguously showed its
intent on this issue, the court, without discussion, proceeded to apply
the second step of the Chevron analysis, which examines whether the
regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute. "9 The court concluded that the regulation was none of the above
and gave deference to the Attorney General's regulation authorizing
employment claims under Title l."98
The Bledsoe analysis is flawed because it unnecessarily reaches
the legislative history and congressional intent issues. Rather than
considering the legislative commentary, the court should have recog-
nized that when the language of the statute is plain, there is no reason
to consider administrative interpretation of the statute. The plain
language of Title II makes no mention of employment discrimination.
None of the rights, remedies, and procedures so diligently laid out in
Title I are part of Title II. Therefore, the plain language of Title II
should govern the court's interpretation and should prevent employ-
ment claims under Title II.
Other circuits holding that Title II applies to employment have
done so without a Chevron analysis, relying instead on the Rehabilita-
tion Act to extend Title II to employment.99 For example, in Holmes,
a professor was dismissed for his inability to provide effective class-
room teaching due to a stroke; the court declined to decide whether
the exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title I was neces-
sary.' Instead, the court held that Title II is identical to the
Rehabilitation Act, and, therefore, employees must be entitled to sue
94. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1173.
95. See Patterson v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109-10 (C.D. Ill.
1999) (supplying several different reasons showing that Congress did not intend Title II to
encompass employment including: (1) Title II does not use or define any employment terms; (2)
Title II is titled "Public Services"; and (3) Title II does not set forth any defenses); Decker v.
University of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ("It is unambiguous that Con-
gress intended that public employees be required to file a charge of discrimination before bring-
ing an ADA suit.").
96. 133 F.3d 816, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1998).
97. Id. at 823.
98. Id.
99. See Holmes v. Texas A&M Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1998); Davoll v. Webb,
194 F.3d 1116, 1130 (10th Cir. 1999).
100. 145 F.3d at 684.
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under Title II.1"1 In a recent Tenth Circuit decision involving two
police officers injured on the job, Davoll v. Webb, the court passed on
the issue of whether Title II applies to employment because the issue
was not raised on appeal.11 2 Instead, the court assumed that Title II
does apply to employment discrimination without discussion.0 3
Other courts have addressed the issue similarly. 10 4
By applying Title II to employment without a Chevron analysis,
several courts have made a dangerous assumption that congressional
intent is not clear from the plain language of Title II. Courts either
skip the first step of the analysis or do not consider Chevron at all. As
a result, public employees are allowed to bypass a well-constructed set
of administrative procedures and bring their claims directly to federal
court. Exhaustion requirements are enacted to promote efficiency and
judicial economy in an already overcrowded judicial system. Without
looking at the language of the statute, these courts allow into their
courtrooms potentially frivolous claims that could possibly have been
settled prior to litigation. In contrast, the following arguments pre-
sented in Zimmerman and in other cases lend support to the claim that
Congress intended employment discrimination claims to go through
the exhaustion requirement of Title I.
V. ARGUMENTS MADE IN ZIMMERMAN AND SUPPORT FROM
OTHER DECISIONS THAT TITLE II DOES NOT APPLY TO
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: "SOMETHING IS ROTTEN IN
THE STATE OF DENMARK"'
0 5
A. Title I Provides Detailed and Comprehensive Employment Provisions
Title I provides comprehensive employment provisions, such as
definitions of "employer" and "employee" and possible defenses for
employers who fail to provide employment accommodations.0 6 In
contrast, Title II is completely devoid of any employment provisions.
The comprehensive employment scheme found in Title I is similar to
those found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA).107
101. Id. at 683-84.
102. 194 F.3d at 1130.
103. Id.
104. See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir.
1995); Castellano v. New York, 142 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (assuming without discussion
that these employees fall within Title II of the ADA).
105. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 4.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 626 et. seq. (1994).
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In Title I, "employee" and "employer" are specifically defined.
An employer must have fifteen or more employees for each working
day."8 The United States government is not considered an employ-
er. 109 The statutory scheme also allows employers certain defenses,
such as business necessity, health and safety standard requirements, or
religious standards. "' Congress has chosen to limit the defenses in
order to remain consistent with the overall goal of preventing discrimi-
nation. Limiting these employment definitions to Title I demon-
strates that Congress intended employment claims to fall under this
Title of the ADA. Title II contains absolutely no mention of the root
or any derivatives of "employ." If employees could sue under Title II,
none of the requirements of Title I would need to be met-neither the
minimum number of employees nor the prohibition against suing the
government. Title II could be construed entirely inconsistently with
Title I, something Congress likely never intended.
Additionally, Title I's employment scheme is similar to the
employment schemes found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Title VII and
the ADEA require a complainant to file his or her charges with the
appropriate agency within 180 days of the discrimination before he or
she may file suit."' Similarly, Title I of the ADA follows the require-
ments set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of the Civil Rights Act." 2 The
purpose of such an administrative review apparatus in these titles is
"(1) to give the employer prompt notice of the complaint against it,
and (2) to give the EEOC sufficient time to attempt the conciliation
process before a civil action is filed.""' With such a similar statutory
requirement in Title I, Congress likely did not expect some employees
would be able to bypass these administrative guidelines.
According to the court in Decker v. University of Houston, reading
the entire statute as a whole, "it is unambiguous that Congress intend-
ed that public employees be required to file a charge of discrimination
before filing an ADA suit."'' 4 To read the ADA any other way would
completely ignore Congress' statutory scheme.
According to the Supreme Court in Russello v. United States,..
"where Congress includes particular language in one section of a
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(I).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12113.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (ADEA).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
113. Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1103 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
114. 970 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
115. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
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statute but omits it in another section of the Act, it is generally pre-
sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion." '116 Thus, without relevant employment lan-
guage in Title II relating to correcting employment discrimination in
an employment setting, we can assume Congress intended Title I, not
Title II, to apply to employment.
B. Congress Defined "Qualified Individual with a Disability"
Differently in Title I Than in Title II
Title I specifically defines a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity," addressing an employee's ability to work, while Title II discusses
a person's eligibility to participate in publicly provided programs or
activities. Title I ("Employment") defines "qualified individual with
a disability" as follows:
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires. For
the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to
the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essen-
tial, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this descrip-
tion shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job. 11
7
Compare that to the language of Title II, which states:
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligi-
bility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 8
Two very different descriptions of "qualified individual with a
disability," with only one focusing on employment, is further evidence
that Congress did not intend both titles to encompass employment.
Because Title I gives a specific description of employment barriers
versus the architectural or transportation barriers in Title II, the
language seems clear. Title II was not meant to address employment.
116. Id. at 23.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
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As further support, Title I provides a very detailed description of
a "reasonable accommodation" in the employment context:
(9) Reasonable accommodation
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily acces-
sible to an usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommoda-
tions for individuals with disabilities. 1 9
Title II contains no similar definition of the term "reasonable
accommodation"; actually, it contains no definition at all. Why would
Congress leave the Attorney General the authority to consider
appropriate reasonable accommodations under Title II, while Con-
gress did not leave similar authority to the more experienced EEOC
under Title I? It is reasonable to assume Congress did not intend
Title II to apply to employment.
Another example may help. Under Title I, applicants currently
using illegal drugs are statutorily excluded from the definition of
disabled employees. 2' However, if employment discrimination was
covered under Title II, the decision of whether to include these indi-
viduals would be left to the Attorney General. Once again, unless
Congress did not intend for Title II to apply to employment, it is
difficult to understand how the Attorney General would do a better
job making this decision than the very experienced EEOC.'21
C. Allowing Employment Claims Under Title II Would
Make Title I Redundant and Allow Public Employees
to Escape Administrative Requirements
"It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision
should be construed to be entirely redundant."'22 However, allowing
public employees to bypass the administrative guidelines would ren-
der Title I redundant. Congress specifically decided to include state
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114.
121. See Patterson v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109 (C.D. I11.
1999).
122. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
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and local government employees within the proviso of Title 1.123 The
only employees exempted were federal. 24 Without having to file a
charge or follow the procedural guidelines of Title I, the provisions
become superfluous for public employees, who will likely choose to
pursue their claims under Title 11.121 Congress expressly included
public employees in Title I by not excluding them; thus, allowing
Title II to include employment discrimination claims would make
Congress' statutory language in Title I "entirely redundant. 126
D. A Different Regulatory Authority Governs Title I Than Title II
The EEOC was created pursuant to Title VII in an effort to
create an agency that would expertly pursue employment discrimina-
tion claims. 127 The EEOC regulates Title I. In contrast, Title II is
regulated by the Attorney General. Thus, if public employees are
allowed to bring employment claims under Title II, public employers
will be subjected to conflicting regulations.
Congress planned for the overlap between Title I (regulated by
the EEOC) and the Rehabilitation Act (regulated by the Attorney
General), but did not plan for any overlap between Title I and Title
11.128 In 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b), Congress requires both agencies to
"develop procedures to ensure that administrative complaints filed
under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are
dealt with in a manner that avoids duplication of effort and prevents
imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same
requirements ... ,129 No similar rule was developed to prevent
overlap or conflicting regulations between Title I and Title II, which
are also governed by two different regulatory authorities. By not
addressing the issue, we can speculate that Congress did not foresee
the problem because it did not expect employment claims to be
brought under Title II.
Additionally, important regulatory decisions about employment
are left to the Attorney General under Title II, while they are detailed
for the EEOC in Title I.13 Congress likely did not leave these
decisions to the Attorney General because it did not intend for
employment to be included in Title II.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).124. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i).
125. See Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1999).
126. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 778.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).
129. Id.
130. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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E. Congress Linked the Employment Provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act to Title I Not Title II
As discussed in Section IV of this Note, the Rehabilitation Act
sections dealing with employment were amended in 1992 to specifi-
cally apply to Title I of the ADA.13' The Zimmerman court's strongest
argument is that when Congress subsequently linked Title I to the
Rehabilitation Act, it expressed its clear intent regarding the relation-
ship between the two statutes. 132 Therefore, when a court states that
Title II must also encompass employment because Title II is modeled
on the Rehabilitation Act, its argument is circular because Congress
has already stated that any and all employment discrimination is part
of Title I. Congress would not have bothered to link the Rehabilita-
tion Act to Title I if employment actions could also be brought under
Title II. Otherwise, Congress quite easily could have linked the
Rehabilitation Act to Title II as well.
VI. CONCLUSION: "GOOD NIGHT SWEET PRINCE, AND FLIGHTS
OF ANGELS SING THEE TO THY REST"' 33
As the curtain falls upon Mr. Zimmerman, the Ninth Circuit's
ruling should remain unchanged. In a world where the courts are
already overcrowded with a variety of discrimination claims, the ADA
stands out as a model statute for efficiently evaluating complex dis-
ability discrimination claims. An employment discrimination claim
simply falls under Title I, whereas a denial of access to a public service
or program falls under Title II. Congress made this clear with its
unambiguous drafting of the ADA, and the Ninth Circuit correctly
interpreted this unambiguous language. Although Mr. Zimmerman is
denied his day in court, he had a viable and accessible solution (filing a
claim with the EEOC), which he did not utilize within the statutorily
prescribed time period. That mistake unfortunately cost Mr. Zim-
merman his remedy, but a crafty reading of Title II is not his antidote.
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).
132. 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999).
133. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc. 2.
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